The battle of Mohi (Muhi) Hungary 15-04-2004

Text copied from: "Militairy History, decembre 1986, see Sources.

On the 10th, one day after the Battle of Liegnitz, the Mongols halted east of Sajo River, ready to engage the Hungarian army. The stage was set to Mongol liking for the decisive battle of the campaign: both strategic flanks were secured; the main army was concentrated on the selected battlefield, and the enemy was completely isolated.

On the afternoon of the 10th, Subudei crossed the Sajo on the stone bridge near Mohi and halted his army some 10 miles farther east. Hoping to tempt Bela into a rash move, he left only a very weak detachment at the bridge. Bela reached the river later the same day, but dissapointed Subudei by ignoring the bait of an unopposed crossing.
Insted, he sestablished a bridgehead on the east bank and occupied a strong position some distance west of the river. Now Subudei had a problem: Bela had to be destroyed within a day or two, before he learned of his total isolation, in which case he would likely retire behind the Danube and garrison the strong fortresses of Western Hungary. They would then have to be reduced one by one. But Bela at the moment occupied a well-protected position, and he did not seem inclined to rush headlong into a trap. Subudei had no choice but to attack under very risky conditions. His two widely seperated forces had to win or perish; they had no practical rout of withdrawal once they were engaged. On the hill above the Hungarian camp he and Batu finalized their strategy.

At dawn on April 11, the Hungarians beat back the first Mongol efforts to take the bridge. Confidently, they jeered at them across the river. The Mongols brought up seven siege engines-flat-trajectory-ballistae and bombarded the garrison of the bridge with firebombs until it withdrew to the west bank.Then the ballistae increased their range, and Mongol squadrons rode over the bridge, covered by a rolling barrage. They swept up Hungarian pickets on the river bank and silently deployed, facing south.

The Hungarian commanders were surprised by the attack -they were used to more conservative methods of war- and only two contingents (ne led by the King's brother Koloman, the other by one of the country's fighting bishops) were ready to engage the onrushing Mongols. They managed to hold until reinforcements came up from the camp, and after the first clashes the Mongols gave ground. The Hungarians, badly shaken by the swift attack, were just regaining their balance when another Mongol force materialized behind them. Subedai had crossed the river with three tumens during the night, and swept behind the Hungarians to take them in the rear.

In the spring the rivers of Hungary are in full flood; they are very deep and swift-formidable obstacles even to modern combat engineers. But the crafty Subedai had moved a large force across the Sajo at night, with a hostile army within easy striking distance. Now he attacked from the least likely direction: the small peninsula, enclosed by river and swamp, looked inaccessible from the east bank and was totally unsuitable for a sizeable force. Its outlet was barely two miles wide; no more than 2.500 horsemen could ride abreast in that space. A mixed detachment of 5.000 archers and heavy troops could have held the bottleneck- but all the Hungarian commanders were looking the other way.

The Hungarians did not panic, but they did lose the initiative. They still had superior numbers, but instead of charging through the Mongol center-much-thinned by the first clashes- they confusedly withdrew into their camp. The Mongols brought up their siege engines and bombarded the camp at leisure for several hours, then charged in three converging columns. Some Hungarian troops fled through a gap left by the Mongols for just such a purpose; soon individual desertions turned into a complete rout. Only a handful of Knights Templar stood their ground. Overwhelmed by the Mongols, they died to a man. King Bela and the mortally wounded Koloman managed to escape; others were not so fortunate. For two days, as demoralized and exhausted Hungarians lurched toward the protection of the Danube River and the twin citadels of Buda and Pest "like stones in a quarry". 70 000 Hungarians died in the debacle.

Text copied from: "Militairy History, june 1997, see Sources.